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Multisensory integration is a powerful mechanism for increasing
adaptive responses, as illustrated by binding of fear expressed in
a face with fear present in a voice. To understand the role of
awareness in intersensory integration of affective information we
studied multisensory integration under conditions of conscious
and nonconscious processing of the visual component of an au-
diovisual stimulus pair. Auditory-event-related potentials were
measured in two patients (GY and DB) who were unable to
perceive visual stimuli consciously because of striate cortex dam-
age. To explore the role of conscious vision of audiovisual pairing,
we also compared audiovisual integration in either naturalistic
pairings (a facial expression paired with an emotional voice) or
semantic pairings (an emotional picture paired with the same
voice). We studied the hypothesis that semantic pairings, unlike
naturalistic pairings, might require mediation by intact visual
cortex and possibly by feedback to primary cortex from higher
cognitive processes. Our results indicate that presenting incongru-
ent visual affective information together with the voice translates
as an amplitude decrease of auditory-event-related potentials. This
effect obtains for both naturalistic and semantic pairings in the
intact field, but is restricted to the naturalistic pairings in the blind
field.
Observers may respond to the expression of a face even thoughthey are unable to report seeing it. For example, when
confronted with a backward-masked, hence unseen, angry face,
observers nevertheless give a reliable skin-conductance response
(1). Facial expressions of fear increase the activation level of the
amygdala, and this effect is lateralized as a function of whether or
not the observer can perceive the faces consciously with right
amygdala activation reported for seen, and left amygdala for
unseen, masked presentation (2). Faces displaying emotional ex-
pressions followed by a backward mask lead to increased activities
among the left amygdala, pulvinar, and superior colliculus (3).
Because these structures are still intact in case of brain damage
restricted to striate cortex, we conjectured that these patients may
also recognize affective stimuli just as they can recognize some
elementary visual stimulus attributes in the absence of awareness,
a phenomenon called blindsight. Accordingly, we have shown that
patient GY, who has a lesion in his striate cortex, was able to
discriminate between facial expressions he could not see and was
not aware of (affective blindsight; refs. 4 and 5). This result is
consistent with the notion that, in normal subjects, unseen facial
expressions are processed by means of a subcortical pathway
involving right amygdala, pulvinar, and colliculus, whereas process-
ing of seen faces increases connectivity in fusiform and orbitofron-
tal cortices (3). Subsequently we confirmed the importance of the
noncortical route in relation to the difference between seenaware
vs. unseenunaware facial fear expression and hemispheric side of
activation (6). The extension of affective blindsight to stimuli other
than faces has not, to our knowledge, previously been envisaged.
A different role of the amygdala concerns its function in cross-
modal binding. Animal studies in which the crossmodal function of
the amygdala has been demonstrated used reward-based condi-
tioning to establish crossmodal pairing (7, 8). We recently explored
pairing between affective expressions of the face and the voice in
humans (9, 10) by measuring the crossmodal bias exercised by the
face on recognition of fear in the voice and vice versa. The pattern
of brain activations suggests that the amygdala plays a critical role
in this process of binding affective information from the voice and
the face. This was indicated by increased activation to fearful faces
when they were accompanied by voices that expressed fear (11).
Electrophysiological recordings of the time course of the cross-
modal bias from the face to the voice indicated that such intersen-
sory integration takes place on-line during auditory perception of
emotion (12, 13) and mainly translates as amplitude change of
exogenous auditory components [i.e., early auditory potential (N1)
and mismatch negativity (MMN)]. Importantly, facial expressions
can bias perception of an affective tone of voice even when the face
is not attended to (14) or cannot be perceived consciously, as is the
case with brain damage to occipitotemporal areas (15). These latter
findings indicate that the crossmodal effect does not depend on
conscious recognition of the visual stimuli. Yet residual vision in the
sense of covert processing (found in some cases of prosopagnosia
with typical occipitotemporal damage) is quite different from a
neuroanatomical point of view from loss of stimulus awareness
caused by striate cortex lesion accompanied by blindsight. Unlike
more anterior areas, striate cortex may play a critical role in
conscious perception (16) andor, because of its involvement in
feedback projections from higher visual areas (17), a role that may
be critical for audiovisual binding.
Here we asked whether unseen visual stimuli could still cross-
modally influence auditory processing in the absence of normal
striate cortex function. The results would provide a crossmodal
approach to existing indirect methods for testing covert processes
that have so far been restricted to single channel methods (18). This
is the first issue we addressed. Our second question concerns the
perception of other emotion-inducing objects besides faces. Visual
stimuli with clear affective valence, such as pictures of spiders,
snakes, or food, have frequently been used to study processes
involved in fear perception (19, 20); but as of yet there is no
evidence that other fear-inducing stimuli besides faces can be
processed in the case of striate cortex lesion. If this is indeed the
case, an important question is whether nonconscious perception of
emotional pictures can influence recognition of emotional voices
similarly to what we predict to be the case for nonconsciously
perceived faces. Alternatively, the processes underlying an affective
scene–voice pairing may require higher-order mediation because
such a pairing is based on semantic properties they might share.
Blindsight patients are of crucial importance for addressing this
issue because they create conditions for testing of audiovisual
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pairings based on semantic associations when the subjects are either
aware or unaware of the visual stimuli.
We studied affective blindsight for emotional pictures in two
patients (GY and DB) with unilateral striate lesions. We recorded
electrical brain responses to presentation of audiovisual stimulus
pairs to the intact and the blind visual field while the subject was
attending to the auditory part of the stimulus pair and making a
task-irrelevant judgment of the gender of the voice (21). We had
two a priori hypotheses. First, we predicted a decrease in amplitude
of N1 for the naturalistic audiovisual pairings (voice–face) for the
condition in which the emotionally congruent face was replaced by
an incongruent one. Second, we expected that a similar effect would
also be found for the semantic pairings (voice–scene) when the
visual stimulus was presented to the intact hemisphere and was fully
processed and consciously perceived. But we did not expect that an
emotional picture presented to the blind field would influence
recognition of voice expressions even if patients had blindsight for
the emotional valence. It was presumed that the subcortical and
amygdala-based activation postulated to be responsible for binding
of emotional faces and voices would not be sufficient for crossmodal
binding of voice–scene pairings. The latter would require mediation
from extra-amygdala representations of the fear-inducing stimuli
that cannot be accessed with striate cortex damage.
Methods
Experimental Sequence. The electroencephalogram (EEG) experi-
ment took place first and was followed some months later by the
behavioral experiment. During the behavioral experiment, eye
movements were monitored by closed-circuit TV. During the EEG
experiment, eye movements were monitored by means of electrodes
attached to the orbits of the eyes calibrated to record deviations
from fixation.
Subjects. Two patients with blindsight (GY and DB) were studied.
Patient GY is a 45-year-old male who sustained damage to the
posterior left hemisphere of his brain by head injury (a road
accident) when he was 7 years old. The lesion (see ref. 22 for an
extensive structural and functional description of the lesion) invades
the left striate cortex (i.e., medial aspect of the left occipital lobe,
slightly anterior to the spared occipital pole, extending dorsally to
the cuneus and ventrally to the lingual, but not the fusiform gyrus)
and surrounding extrastriate cortex (inferior parietal lobule). The
location of the lesion is functionally confirmed by perimetry field
tests (see ref. 23 for a representation of GY’s perimetric field and
ref. 24 for a comparison).
DB is a 61-year-old male from whom an arterious venous
malformation in his medial right occipital lobe was surgically
removed when he was 33. As clinical visual symptoms were first
noted in his teens, it is presumed that the nonmalignant tumor had
been present for several years, perhaps even prenatally. The exci-
sion extended 6 cm anterior to the occipital pole and included the
major portion of the calcarine cortex on the medial surface. The
operation produced a homonymous macula-splitting hemianopia,
with a crescent of preserved vision at the periphery of the upper
quadrant. Because metal clips were used in the surgical procedure
(including an aneurysm clip), MRI scans are not possible. Some
information can be discerned from a computed tomography (CT)
scan, which is clear in demonstrating no remaining striate cortex in
the upper bank of the calcarine fissure, corresponding to the lower
quadrant of the impaired hemifield. It is presumed, from surgical
notes, that the lower bank was also destroyed, although the CT is
severely distorted. He was studied in a series of psychophysical tests
in 1974 by Weiskrantz and collaborators (25), leading to the original
characterization of ‘‘blindsight,’’ and then subsequently for more
than 10 years, with results summarized in 1986 by Weiskrantz (26).
Contact was broken for some years, but he has been seen again in
a series of ongoing studies since 1999. His blindsight capacities are
essentially the same as originally described.
Behavioral Experiment. GY and DB were presented with visual
stimuli in a direct guessing paradigm used similarly for facial
expressions and emotional pictures. Visual materials consisted of
black and white photographs of facial expressions and emotional
pictures. The face set consisted of 12 images (six individuals, once
with a happy facial expression and once with a fearful facial
expression; ref. 27). Emotional pictures were 12 black and white
static pictures selected from the International Affective Picture
System (20) because they presented a homogenous class of nonfa-
cial stimuli. There were 6 negative pictures (snake, pit bull, 2
spiders, roaches, and shark; mean valence: 4.04  0.4) and 6 positive
ones (porpoises, bunnies, lion, puppies, kitten, and baby seal; mean
valence: 7.72  0.45). Stimulus properties (luminance and mean
size), presentation modalities, and task requirements for the two
types of visual materials were designed so as to be maximally
comparable. Visual stimuli were presented on a 17-inch screen.
Mean size of the face pictures was 6-cm width by 8-cm height
(sustaining a visual angle of 5.73° horizontally by 7.63° vertically)
and 8-cm width by 6-cm height for the emotional pictures (sustain-
ing a visual angle of 7.63° horizontally by 5.73° vertically). Mean
luminance was 25 cd/m2 and less than 1 cd/m2 for the background
and ambient light.
A trial consisted of the presentation of the visual stimulus (face
or scene) in the blind field lasting for 1,250 ms. The subject was
instructed to make a two-alternative forced-choice response be-
tween happy and fearful and to respond with their dominant hand
by pressing the corresponding button of a response box. He was
instructed to make his judgement before the end of the stimulus
presentation (within 1,250 ms after stimulus onset) to eliminate any
interference by offset transients (in DB, the offset of a stimulus
under certain conditions gives rise to after-images; ref. 28) and to
maintain fixation during the block. Intertrial interval was 1,000 ms.
Two blocks of 48 trials (24 faces and 24 pictures) were randomly
presented (four blocks with GY).
EEG Experiment. Stimuli consisted of pairings of an auditory and a
visual component presented simultaneously. Visual materials were
identical those of the behavioral experiment. Auditory materials
consisted of 12 bisyllabic spoken words obtained with the following
procedure. Six male and six female actors were instructed to
pronounce a neutral sentence (‘‘they are traveling by plane’’) in an
emotional tone of voice (either happy or fearful). Speech samples
were recorded on a Digital Audio Tape recorder and subsequently
digitized and amplified (using SOUNDEDIT 16 1.0 B4 running on
Macintosh). Tokens of the final word ‘‘plane’’ were then selected by
using SOUNDEDIT, resulting in a total of 24 samples (12 actors  2
tones of voice). They were presented in a pilot study to 8 volunteers
(4 males and 4 females), none of whom participated in the exper-
iment. Subjects labeled each fragment as ‘‘happy,’’ ‘‘fearful,’’ or
‘‘don’t know.’’ Based on their recognition rates, 12 fragments were
selected (mean recognition rate 74% correct). Audiovisual pairings
were obtained by combining a sound fragment with either a facial
expression or an emotional scene. Pairings were either congruent
or incongruent. There were 12 pairs for each visual condition. Trials
were generated by using the STIM software running on a PC
Pentium II. Visual stimuli were presented as described above.
Sounds were delivered over two loudspeakers placed on each side
of the screen at a mean sound level of 72 dB.
A trial consisted of the presentation of the visual stimulus
followed after 900 ms by the voice fragment (duration 381  50 ms),
during which the image remained on the screen (Fig. 1). This delay
between visual and auditory stimulus onset was introduced to
reduce interference from the brain response elicited by the visual
stimuli (12, 13). The 12 fragments used for the congruent and
incongruent conditions as well as for the two visual conditions were
always identical (the only difference was the emotional valence of
the faceemotional picture they were paired with). Four blocks of
192 trials (48 stimuli consisting of 24 face–voice pairs and 24
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scene–voice pairs, half congruent and half incongruent, repeated
four times) were randomly presented in each hemifield. Intertrial
interval was 1,000 ms. Subjects were tested in a dimly lit room seated
60 cm away from the screen. The subjects were instructed to fixate
a central cross on the screen and not to pay attention to the visual
stimuli appearing in the periphery. Their task was to perform a
gender decision on the voices.
Data Acquisition. Auditory event-related brain potentials were re-
corded and processed by using a 64-channel acquisition system
(Neuroscan). Horizontal and vertical electro-oculographic (EOG)
monitoring was realized by using four facial bipolar electrodes
placed on the outer canthi of the eyes and in the inferior and
superior areas of the orbit. Scalp EEG was recorded from 58
electrodes mounted in an Electrocap (10–20 system) with a linked-
mastoids reference, amplified with a gain of 30,000 and bandpass-
filtered at 0.01–100 Hz. Impedance was kept below 5 k. EEG and
EOG were continuously acquired at a rate of 500 Hz.
Data Analysis. After removal of EEG and EOG artefacts (epochs
with EEG or EOG exceeding 70 V were excluded from the
averaging), epoching was made 100 ms before auditory stimulus
onset and for 924 ms after stimulus presentation. Data were
low-pass filtered at 30 Hz. Maximum amplitudes of auditory
event-related brain potentials (AEPs) were measured relative to a
100-ms prestimulus baseline and assessed by using repeated-
measures ANOVAs and Student’s t tests. To carry out these
ANOVAs, the four blocks for each hemifield for each patient were
considered as nonrepeated and entered in the analyses as indepen-
dent measures. Statistical analyses were focused on the amplitude
modulation of the central negative deflection occurring 110 ms
after auditory stimulus and called the N1 component. For each
condition, the mean amplitude of the N1 component was measured
relative to the maximum negativity at nine adjacent central elec-
trodes (C3A, CzA, C4A, C3, Cz, C4, C3P, PzA, and C4P) in the 90-
to 150-ms interval. These nine electrodes with a central topography
were chosen because they are best suited to record early exogenous
AEPs simultaneously at several scalp positions.
Results
Behavioral Results. For 40 of 96 trials, DB responded after the
stimulus offset (despite instructions to respond during the stimulus
presentation) leaving only 56 trials for the analysis. He was signif-
icantly above chance in forced choice guessing the affective content
of the visual stimuli presented in his blind visual field and equally
well for the two visual categories. For emotional pictures, DB made
522 errors or 77% correct [2 (1)  15.7, P  0.001]. For facial
expressions, he made 734 errors (4 happy and 3 fear) or 79%
correct [2 (1)  18.4, P  0.001].
GY was at chance level for facial expressions (4594 errors or
52% correct), but was above chance level for emotional pictures
[3494 errors or 64% correct, 2 (1)  7.84, P  0.01] with 1248
errors (75% correct) for fear and 2246 (52%) for happy trials.
EEG Results. Behavioral data collected online indicate that as
expected the task irrelevant gender decision was easy (95% for GY
and 85% for DB). Our main interest focused on amplitude changes
of the auditory N1 component that would be a function of the type
of visual stimulus. Significant main effects of laterality, anteriority,
or emotion, as well as interactions between these variables, are
therefore reported only when they significantly interact with one of
the main experimental variables (hemifield, visual category, and
congruency).
Intact visual field. Results supported by statistical analyses re-
vealed that for GY incongruent audiovisual pairs elicited a lower
N1 component than congruent pairs at several electrode positions
for both types of visual stimuli. The ANOVA performed on the
mean amplitude of the N1 component at nine electrode positions
with the factors Visual Category (nonfacial context vs. facial contex),
Emotion (happy vs. fearful), Congruency (congruent vs. incongru-
ent pairs), Anteriority (anterior, central, and posterior), and Later-
ality (left, mid-line, or right) indicated a significant interaction
visual category  anteriority [F(2,6)  5.3, P  0.05] and a
significant interaction between the five variables [F(4,12)  5.7, P 
0.01]. For scene–voice pairs, the 2 (emotion)  2 (congruency) 
3 (anteriority)  3 (laterality) interaction approaches significance
[F(4,12)  2.6, P  0.09]. Post hoc t tests for the two emotions
averaged together showed that for four of nine electrode positions
[C3A, t(3)  2.12, P  0.056; C3, t(3)  2.2, P  0.049; C3P, t(3) 
4.1, P  0.005; C4P, t(3)  2.14, P  0.054] incongruent pairs elicit
a lower N1 component than congruent pairs (Table 1 and Fig. 2a).
For face–voice pairs, the analysis revealed a significant interaction
emotion  congruency  anteriority [F(2,6)  6.71, P  0.05] and
a significant interaction congruency  anteriority  laterality
[F(4,12)  3.43, P  0.05]. For 5 of 9 electrode positions [C3A,
t(3)  3.1, P  0.01; Cz, t(3)  3.02, P  0.05; C4, t(3)  3.04, P 
0.05; PzA, t(3)  5.18, P  0.001; C4P, t(3)  3.03, P  0.05] post
hoc t tests showed that incongruent pairs elicited a lower N1
component than congruent pairs (Table 1 and Fig. 2a).
Results for DB were very similar. For scene–voice pairs, post hoc
t tests showed that for two of nine electrode positions [PzA, t(3) 
2.13, P  0.055; C4P, t(3)  4.53, P  0.001], incongruent pairs elicit
a lower N1 component than congruent pairs (Table 2 and Fig. 2b).
For face–voice pairs, post hoc t tests showed that for three of nine
electrode positions [C3, t(3)  2.17, P  0.051; PzA, t(3)  3.43, P 
0.005; C4P, t(3)  2.92, P  0.05], incongruent pairs elicit a lower
N1 component than congruent pairs (Table 2 and Fig. 2b).
Blind visual field. For GY, the ANOVA on the mean amplitude
of the N1 component for visual presentations in the blind visual
field revealed a significant interaction visual category  emotion 
anteriority [F(2,6)  5.58, P  0.05]. For scene–voice presentations,
the ANOVA did not disclose any significant interaction with
congruency. For face–voice presentations, the interaction congru-
ency  anteriority approached significance [F(2,6)  3.94, P 
0.081] indicating that incongruent face–voice pairs elicited a lower
N1 component at central [t(3)  2.39, P  0.054] and centroparietal
leads [t(3)  3.93, P  0.01] but not at anterior leads [t(3)  1] than
congruent face–voice pairs (Table 1 and Fig. 2a). The decrease in
amplitude of the N1 component for incongruent face–voice pairs is
Fig. 1. Experimental design (EEG experiment). Subjects viewed either happy or
fearful visual stimulus (a face or a scene) while listening to the word ‘‘plane’’
spoken in either happy or fearful tones. There were eight resulting conditions:
congruent happy face, congruent happy scene, incongruent happy face, incon-
gruent happy scene, congruent fearful face, congruent fearful scene, incongru-
ent fearful face, and incongruent fearful scene. Subjects were instructed to
identify the gender of the voice as either male or female (by means of a button
press).








maximum at the right centroparietal leads C4P [t(3)  3.35, P 
0.01].
For DB, the ANOVA disclosed a significant interaction visual
category  anteriority [F(2,6)  9.01, P  0.05], a significant
interaction visual category  emotion  anteriority [F(2,6)  23.41,
P  0.005] and a significant interaction visual category  congru-
ency  anteriority  laterality [F(4,12)  3.47, P  0.05]. For
scene–voice pairs, none of the nine post hoc t tests is significant
(Table 2 and Fig. 2b). For face–voice pairs, post hoc t tests showed
that for three (all situated in the right hemisphere) of nine electrode
positions [C4A, t(3)  3.48, P  0.005; C4, t(3)  4.3, P  0.005;
C4P, t(3)  2.93, P  0.05], incongruent pairs elicit a lower N1
component than do congruent pairs (Table 2 and Fig. 2b).
Comparison between intact and blind visual field. N1 amplitude
observed in GY is highest at centroparietal leads (C3P, PzA, and
C4P), and the incongruency effect generated by the visual stimulus
Fig. 2. The x axis represents the time in ms (from 50 ms before auditory stimulus onset to 310 ms after stimulus onset). The y axis represents the amplitude
in V from 8 V to 8 V. Grand averaged auditory waveforms and corresponding topographies (horizontal axis) at central electrodes in each visual condition
(congruent pairs in black, incongruent pairs in red) and for each visual hemifield are shown. For each topographical map (N1 and P2 components), the time
interval is 20 ms and the amplitude scale goes from 6 V (in blue) to 6 V (in red).









LVF (intact VF) P3P Face congruent 12.1
Face incongruent 11.92 0.51
Scene congruent 12.25
Scene incongruent 10.59 4.09**
PzP Face congruent 9.22
Face incongruent 7.38 5.18**
Scene congruent 9.34
Scene incongruent 9.03 0.77
P4P Face congruent 7.14
Face incongruent 6.06 3.03**
Scene congruent 8.13
Scene incongruent 7.26 2.14*
RVF (blind VF) P3P Face congruent 12.1
Face incongruent 11.54 1.22
Scene congruent 12.36
Scene incongruent 12.44 0.21
PzP Face congruent 9.4
Face incongruent 8.77 1.41
Scene congruent 8.57
Scene incongruent 8.85 0.75
P4P Face congruent 8.55
Face incongruent 7.03 3.35**
Scene congruent 8.18
Scene incongruent 8.22 0.12
Mean amplitude of the N1 component for three electrode positions in each
visual condition (scene or face, congruent or incongruent) and for each visual
hemifield (leftintact vs. rightblind). *, Indicates a P value for the t test  0.05;
**, P  0.01.









LVF (blind VF) P3P Face congruent 8.63
Face incongruent 8.43 0.65
Scene congruent 6.73
Scene incongruent 6.84 0.24
PzP Face congruent 8.59
Face incongruent 8.54 0.15
Scene congruent 6.89
Scene incongruent 6.65 0.55
P4P Face congruent 8.39
Face incongruent 7.49 2.93**
Scene congruent 6.41
Scene incongruent 5.97 0.99
RVF (intact VF) P3P Face congruent 7.74
Face incongruent 7.63 0.27
Scene congruent 6.89
Scene incongruent 7.17 0.96
PzP Face congruent 8.1
Face incongruent 6.62 3.43**
Scene congruent 7.12
Scene incongruent 6.49 2.13*
P4P Face congruent 7.88
Face incongruent 6.35 3.55**
Scene congruent 7.8
Scene incongruent 6.48 4.53**
Mean amplitude of the N1 component for three electrode positions in each
visual condition (scene or face, congruent or incongruent) and for each visual
hemifield (leftblind vs. rightintact). *, Indicates a P value for the t test  0.05;
**, P  0.01.
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(either a facial expression or an emotional picture) to auditory
processing (as indexed by an amplitude modulation of the N1
component) appears to be stronger in the right hemisphere (C4P)
than the left hemisphere (C3P) or the mid-line position (PzA) as
revealed in the previous ANOVAs by significant interactions
between anteriority and laterality.
To compare directly the effect of visual category on the early
auditory processing in the intact and blind hemifield, a repeated-
measures ANOVA was carried out on the mean amplitude of the
N1 component at three electrode positions (C3P, PzA, and C4P)
with the factors Hemifield (intact vs. blind), Visual Category (non-
facial vs. facial contex), Emotion (happy vs. fearful), Congruency
(congruent vs. incongruent pairs), and Laterality (left, mid-line, or
right). The analysis revealed a significant interaction visual cate-
gory  emotion [F(1,3)  9.37, P  0.055], a significant interaction
hemifield  visual category  laterality [F(2,6)  15.74, P  0.005]
and a significant interaction between the four variables [F(2,6) 
7.74, P  0.05]. Importantly, in the intact visual field, incongruent
pairs elicited a lower N1 component than congruent pairs whatever
the category of the visual stimulus [at C4P, if the visual stimulus is
a face, t(3)  2.79, P  0.05; if the visual stimulus is a scene, t(3) 
2.26, P  0.065], whereas in the blind visual field, incongruent pairs
elicit a lower N1 component than congruent pairs only if the visual
stimulus is a face [t(3)  3.93, P  0.01] and not if the visual stimulus
is a scene [t(3)  0.11, P 	 0.9].
Similar to that of patient GY, the amplitude of the N1 in DB is
maximum at centroparietal leads (C3P, PzA, and C4P) and the
incongruency effect from the visual stimulus to the early auditory
processing seems to be stronger in the right hemisphere (C4P) than
the left hemisphere (C3P) or the mid-line position (PzA) as
revealed in the previous ANOVAs by significant interactions
between anteriority and laterality. The repeated-measures
ANOVA analysis revealed a significant interaction congruency 
laterality [F(2,6)  5.69, P  0.05] and a significant interaction
visual category  emotion  congruency [F(1,3)  10.67, P  0.05].
Importantly, in the intact visual field, incongruent pairs elicited a
lower N1 component than congruent pairs whatever the category
of the visual stimulus [at C4P, if the visual stimulus is a face, t(3) 
2.6, P  0.05; if the visual stimulus is a scene, t(3)  2.25, P  0.065],
whereas in the blind visual field, incongruent pairs elicit a lower N1
component than congruent pairs only if the visual stimulus is a face
[t(3)  2.93, P  0.05] and not if the visual stimulus is a scene [t(3) 
0.75, P 	 0.5].
Discussion
The first noteworthy result is that both patients are able to
nonconsciously discriminate the expression of emotional pic-
tures. DB performed equally well in guessing the emotional
attribute of faces and pictures. Results with GY are consistent
with our previous findings that he performed at chance level in
a direct guessing task with static facial expression shown to his
blind field (4). Although he was above chance for moving facial
expressions, indirect testing methods provided evidence that still
images are recognized (5).
The electrophysiological results obtained in GY and DB clearly
indicate that facial expressions as well as emotional pictures influ-
ence the way emotional voices are processed as indicated by the
decreased amplitude of the N1 component. The bias effect occurs
early in the course of auditory perception (around 110 ms after the
onset of the auditory stimulus). Our data indicate that intact striate
cortex and conscious vision of the stimuli modulate this effect. Our
results suggest that in the absence of V1, the crossmodal bias effect
is restricted to the pairings of a voice with a face and does not obtain
for the pairings of a voice with an emotional picture, although these
pictures can reliably be discriminated in the blind field.
The N1 (or N100) auditory component is described as a late
cortical exogenous component with a central topography, and is
composed of multiple subcomponents (29). Its amplitude is mod-
ulated by auditory selective attention with an enlarged N1 elicited
by attended stimuli (30). The present EEG results obtained for
stimuli in the normal visual fields of two hemianopic patients are
similar to previous EEG results obtained with normal observers
showing that a facial expression modulates concurrent voice pro-
cessing as early as 110 ms after voice onset (12, 13). The fact that
the crossmodal bias effect consists in a decrease in amplitude of the
auditory N1 component for incongruent face–voice pairs suggests
that early voice processing is reduced in the context of an incon-
gruent visual stimulus. Our results are consistent with reported
sensitivity of the auditory N1 component to the audiovisual pairing
(31). Visual bias of auditory processing has also been observed with
functional MRI and consisted of an increase of the blood–oxygen
level-dependent response in the primary auditory cortex when
heard syllables were accompanied by lip reading (32). Moreover, a
reduction in amplitude of voice processing (as indexed by the N1
component) as a function of the concurrent visual context is mainly
observed for electrode positions located in the right hemisphere
irrespective of the side of lesion of the patient. This observation is
consistent with neuropsychological and brain-imaging data indicat-
ing the preferential involvement of the right hemisphere during the
processing of emotional prosody (33).
We can discount three possible explanations for the observed
difference in crossmodal effect between face pairs and scene pairs.
First, it is unlikely that the observed effects are related to attentional
factors or to any kind of response bias. Throughout the EEG
experiment, subjects’ attention was kept on a task-irrelevant prop-
erty of the voice. Moreover, the fact that a facial expression
influences concurrent processing of the voice expression as early as
110 ms after stimulus suggests that this pairing takes place at an
early perceptual stage, in the sense that it does not depend on a
postperceptual decision that might be under endogenous atten-
tional control (10). A second potential explanation that we can
discard is that the N1 modulation does not reflect crossmodal
binding but instead reflects a heightened state of affect in the
system caused by the simultaneous presence of the face or scene and
the voice. This explanation would predict, contrary to our findings,
a similar effect for the face–voice and scene–voice pairings. Third,
the possibility that the difference in the crossmodal bias for faces
and pictures in the blind field results from a difference in visual
complexity is unlikely because the behavioral data indicate that
faces and pictures are discriminated equally well by DB and pictures
are actually better discriminated than faces by GY.
What are the possible anatomical circuits that could mediate
audiovisual interactions and could explain why, in the absence of
striate cortex, some pairs are preserved while others are lost? If
faces and pictures can be equally well discriminated in the blind
field, the differences in the results obtained when each is paired with
the same voice may reside in the critical contribution of striate
cortex andor other cortical processes to one type of pairing but not
to the other. Striate cortex loss may damage the mechanism that is
the basis of scene–voice pairings but leave intact the neural circuitry
for face–voice pairings. In this context, two alternatives can be
envisaged at present. One relates to visual awareness per se. A
striate cortex lesion is associated with loss of conscious vision, which
might be assumed to be necessary for intersensory binding. Such a
view is inconsistent with the finding that crossmodal effects can be
covert (15). Beyond that, it fails to explain why there is a difference
in binding between voices with scenes, on the one hand, and faces,
on the other hand.
A second explanation can be proposed that focuses instead on
limbic–cortical routes and the role of striate cortex in cortico–
cortical feedback loops from more anterior areas. Such an expla-
nation would run as follows. With striate cortex damage, other
structures receiving a direct retinal input, such as the superior
colliculus and the pulvinar, can compensate to some extent and
support some visual discriminations, but they cannot compensate
for feedback from anterior cortical areas to early visual areas (17,








34, 35). Residual vision based on such extrastriate routes probably
lies at the basis of blindsight for faces and pictures alike, as observed
in the present behavioral data. But the extent to which these routes
can compensate in a multisensory setting appears to be limited.
Colliculus- and pulvinar-based vision does not compensate for
cortico–cortical connections and a fortiori does not compensate for
cortico–cortical feedback projections in which the striate cortex is
normally involved. Both types of connections might be needed for
the involvement of vision in semantic pairings like the picture–voice
ones used here. Although facial expressions and affective pictures
can be successfully processed by observers with striate cortex
damage, the former but not the latter can interact with information
from another sensory system because the latter, unlike the former,
requires intact cortico–cortical processing loops.
At present, support for this explanation is provided by the finding
that noncortical vision of facial expressions is not associated with
fusiform activity (6), by the finding of increased amygdala activation
for face–voice pairs (11) and of increased activity in heteromodal
cortical areas such as the middle temporal gyrus (G.P., B.d.G., A.
Bol, and M. Crommelinck, unpublished data). The point is also
illustrated in a functional MRI study with GY where we observed
increased activation to fearful face–voice pairs in the amygdala and
in the fusiform area for visual presentations in the intact field (6).
The important finding, as far as the present explanation is con-
cerned, is that amygdala activation was equally observed when faces
were presented in the blind field but without the associated increase
in activation in fusiform cortex. When affective pictures are rec-
ognized unconsciously, as our behavioral data indicate that can be,
visual recognition may also be implemented via a route to limbic
structures, but not achieve activation in a cortical area or areas
necessary for perception of pictures, homologous to the involve-
ment of fusiform cortex in perception of faces. This absence of
cortical activation normally associated with subcortical activity may
be a crucial element for understanding that noncortical routes can
sustain some audiovisual pairings but not others. One may conjec-
ture that in the neurologically intact observer anterior activation is
associated with feed-forward cortico–cortical activation from fusi-
form to heteromodal areas (35) (as well as feedback activation to
striate cortex and conscious perception as envisaged in the first
explanation above). Yet our results indicate that the probable
nonstriate neural circuitry processing these face stimuli is sufficient
for binding face–voice pairs. This finding suggests that the cortical
activity that accompanies perception of a face expression in the
intact visual field is not a crucial requirement for successful
voice–face pairing. However, what holds for face–voice pairs may
not hold for picture–voice pairs even if on their own faces and
pictures are processed by the same neural circuitry. Without the
kind of activation in extrastriate areas associated with striate vision,
binding between pictures and voices may not be possible. The need
for cortical activation would correspond to the fact that the pairing
between a picture and a voice requires mediation by semantic
systems of the brain and involves higher and more anterior areas.
Given the relevance of facial expressions for human communication
and, more importantly, the biological link between voice prosody
and face expressions, the existence of specialized systems underly-
ing a natural audiovisual pairing like a face–voice combination as
compared with a pairing such as picture–voice that requires se-
mantic mediation, has evolutionary value.
Finally, the special status of the face–voice pairings might be
boosted by an additional mechanism. Normal subjects spontane-
ously imitate facial expressions even if these are followed by a rapid
backward mask and are not consciously perceived (36). An inter-
esting possibility is that binding of a face and a voice is mediated by
such spontaneous imitation of the facial expression, a mechanism
that is absent in scene–voice pairs. It would be of interest to record
muscular changes in the facial pattern of subjects in these studies,
for the blind as well as intact visual fields, which could provide
additional evidence not only of the existence of processing of
emotional material but a possible mediating role in crossmodal
binding.
We thank GY and DB for their cooperation and patience during long
hours of testing.
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